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ABSTRACT 
 
The 2008-09 economic crisis has been identified as an important element contributing 
to declining trust in institutions in Europe and worldwide. However, it is unclear 
whether this decline in trust is distributed homogenously among citizens or whether 
there are differences across social strata. This article applies multilevel models to six 
waves of European Social Survey data to analyse changes in trust in the European 
Parliament from 2002 to 2012 in 20 EU countries. Moreover, we investigate whether 
individuals with different socio-economic backgrounds experienced different 
reductions in trust. Our results indicate that trust in the European Parliament declined 
the most in the peripheral European countries hit hardest by the economic crisis: 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Spain. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that the decline in trust was more pronounced among subjects with lower social 
status. The tightening of the link between social and political inequalities is especially 
preoccupying considering the importance of trust in institutions for citizens to actively 
participate in society, voice their needs, and demand their place at the table. Hence, 
the worsening economic conditions combined with declining levels of trust are not 
only troublesome for the functioning of democracies as a whole, but they are also 
problematic at the individual level, as they are likely to perpetuate the divide among 
subjects at different ends of the social ladder. 
 
KEYWORDS: trust, recession, social inequalities, peripheral Europe, European 
Parliament 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Several scholars have come to identify the 2008-09 economic crisis as a major factor 
contributing to falling trust in various European institutions (Ehrmann, Soudan & 
Stracca 2013; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; Armingeon & Ceka 2014; 
Armingeon & Guthman 2014). However, it is yet to be understood whether in 
response to the crisis trust has declined equally across European countries and 
whether the decline varies among individuals with different socio-economic 
backgrounds. This article addresses these questions, first by investigating whether 
trust in the European Parliament (EP) declined from 2002 to 2012 in 20 European 
Union countries and, second, by ascertaining whether the decline was unequal and 
therefore steeper in the peripheral European countries that were hit hardest by the 
economic crisis: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, Greece and Spain. Third, arguing 
that ‘increasing inequality in economic conditions may lead to growing cynicism 
among those at the lower end of the social status ladder’ (Dalton 2005: 139), we 
investigate whether individuals from less privileged social strata – i.e. the 
unemployed, the retired, the poorly educated, those from low-income households, the 
youth and the elderly – and in the countries where the economic downturn hit the 
hardest are the most likely to mistrust the European Parliament, especially after the 
onset of the 2008-09 economic crisis. A growing gap in trust between social strata 
would be preoccupying, as it would indicate that the economic crisis strengthened the 
link between social and political inequalities, potentially leading to alienation from 
the political world of the most disadvantaged citizens, or worse, to anti-democratic 
mobilization driven by anti-establishment populist parties (Kriesi et al. 2012; Offe 
2006). 
 
Trust in institutions has been deemed necessary to secure the functioning of modern 
democracies and the maintenance of institutional arrangements (Dalton 2004; Van der 
Meer 2010; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013). Social scientists agree that the 
trust of citizens is crucial for the legitimacy of institutions and to preserve their 
survival (Keele 2007; Mosch & Prast 2008; Roth 2009; Kaltenthaler, Anderson & 
Miller 2010; Wälti 2012). It is therefore a troubling finding that over recent decades 
trust in democratic institutions has declined in both new and established democracies 
(Norris 1999; Pharr & Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004, 2005). 
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When the public debt crisis hit the Eurozone, its consequences were more serious in 
some countries than in others, and peripheral European countries were particularly hit 
(Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; Bosco & Verney 2012). In response to the 
crisis and in agreement with the European Central Bank (ECB), the European 
Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – the so-called Troika –
fiscal austerity packages and structural reforms were implemented in crisis-struck 
peripheral European countries. In this article, we argue that the severity of these 
European Union (EU) anti-crisis interventions triggered feelings of mistrust towards 
EU institutions, as people might have felt that these institutions were responsible for 
the continuation of the crisis (Armingeon & Guthman 2014; Torcal 2014). In other 
words, it is hypothesized that trust in EU institutions declined (the “external 
constraint”) – suggesting that the harsh consequences of the economic crisis may have 
worsened the negative effect of a perceived lack of institutional responsiveness on 
trust in the European Parliament (Torcal 2014).  
 
Moreover, trust in institutions is not equally distributed among populations (Dalton 
2005). In general, people with higher social status are likely to demonstrate greater 
support for the political system they live in, as they are the ones who mostly benefit 
from it (Almond & Verba 1963; Stokes 1962; Anderson & Reichert 1996; Hooghe & 
Marks 2005). However, recent studies have shown that people with higher social 
status in established democracies do not necessarily have greater trust in institutions 
than people with lower social status (Dalton 2005; Catterberg & Moreno 2005; 
Muñoz, Torcal & Bonet 2011; Arnold, Sapir & Zapryanova 2012). These studies 
suggest that subjects with better education have higher expectations of democracy 
than in the past and thus have become more critical of their governments and less 
trustful (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2004). However, during an economic downturn and 
especially in times of constrained budgetary policies, people from the lower social 
strata are the most likely to suffer from austerity measures and, hence, might 
withdraw their support from institutions (see Gabel & Palmer 1995; Anderson & 
Reichert 1996; and Gabel 1998). The question of increasing inequality in trust is 
especially important in times of economic crisis. In fact, if during the recession trust 
declined more steeply for those social groups already hit by the economic 
consequences of the crisis (Hoynes, Miller & Schaller 2012; Petmesidou & Guillén 
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2014), these groups are being doubly impoverished: not just in terms of their social 
position and their economic well-being, but also in the extent to which they have 
confidence in institutions. This perceived lack of representation may in the worst-case 
scenarios leave the ground open to anti-liberal and anti-democratic political 
entrepreneurs with populist views, which may ultimately threaten the institutional 
order of liberal democracy (Offe 2006). 
 
In this article, using multilevel models and European Social Survey data (ESS 2014), 
we first test whether trust in the European Parliament declined from before (2002-06) 
to after (2008-2012) the onset of the crisis in 20 EU countries. Overall, due to the 
unprecedented magnitude of the financial and economic crisis and the severity of the 
austerity measures, we anticipate larger declines in trust in the European Parliament in 
those countries most hit by the economic crisis – i.e. Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Cyprus, 
Greece and Spain – than in the other states considered. Second, we test whether 
individuals who are more vulnerable to the economic recession – i.e. the poorly 
educated, the unemployed, the retired, those who find it difficult to cope on their 
current household income, and the youth and the elderly – have lower trust in the 
European Parliament before or after the beginning of the crisis. Our results indicate 
that over the time period considered trust in the European Parliament steeply declined 
in the countries worst hit by the crisis and that it is especially in these countries that 
subjects from the lower social strata lost more trust than citizens at the higher end of 
the social ladder. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The 2008 crisis and trust in institutions in European countries 
 
The economic crisis had asymmetric effects across European countries. The starkest 
asymmetry is reflected by the contrast between northern European economies, with 
export-growth models, and southern European economies, with demand-led growth 
models (Hall 2014). Excessive lending and borrowing eventually led to a global 
banking crisis, which in turn led to a confidence crisis in financial markets around the 
world. This triggered both direct and indirect pressures from international financial 
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markets and from supranational organizations, such as the IMF, the EU, and the ECB, 
insisting on austerity measures and long-postponed structural reforms in the countries 
badly hit by the crisis. In May 2010, Greece was the first country to be priced out of 
the bond market as its sovereign credit rating was downgraded to junk status, closely 
followed by Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus (Lane 2012). On the one hand, Greece, 
Ireland, Cyprus and Portugal entered economic adjustment programmes, 
implementing the economic and financial policies expected of them in order to 
improve their competitiveness and fiscal sustainability; on the other hand, in 2012 
Spain entered a financial assistance programme for the restructuring and 
recapitalization of its financial system and was subject to bank-specific conditionality. 
In addition to this, Spain and Italy both had to deal with a more implicit form of 
conditionality, with an unprecedented intrusion of the ECB in their national affairs 
(Sacchi 2015). In August 2011 the ECB sent a letter to the Italian and Spanish 
governments asking for immediate reforms and implying that the ECB would 
purchase Italian and Spanish bonds in the secondary market but only on the condition 
that this reform package was approved. 
 
In contrast, the coordinated market economies of northern Europe (i.e. Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and Finland) largely escaped the economic 
problems that plagued southern European countries and Ireland, while the UK, a 
prime example of a liberal market economy, struggled to recover from the economic 
crisis despite its loose monetary policy. France, more of a mixed-market economy, 
was hit much harder by the global economic crisis compared to the northern block, 
with growing unemployment and serious imbalances in public finances and external 
trade. The crisis hit the Central and Eastern European (CEE) block in different ways. 
Since the 2000s, the CEE economies had experienced large capital inflows from the 
West, a credit boom, and a rapid increase in consumption and investment 
(Guardiancich 2012). Banking and currency crises occurred almost simultaneously in 
the CEE countries in 2008. The countries most affected were those most reliant on 
exports, such as Slovakia, Slovenia and Estonia. Slovakia and Estonia went through a 
severe but short recession in 2009, but they recovered quickly and returned to pre-
boom growth rates in 2010 (Fidrmuc et al. 2013). In Hungary, the global financial and 
economic crisis had severe effects on its already fragile and highly indebted economy. 
The Czech Republic was hit through the external trade channel for the most part, but 
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the recession did not last long since domestic imbalances were small. Poland, which 
had a well-developed internal market, almost avoided the impact of the crisis and it 
was one of the best growth performers among OECD countries during the crisis 
(Guardiancich 2012). 
 
Overall, the crisis affected peripheral European countries more severely than northern 
and CEE countries. Furthermore, the austerity measures adopted from 2010 to 2012 
‘consisting of legislative decisions and new intergovernmental treaties […] were 
nevertheless unable to promote effective and legitimate solutions for dealing with the 
financial crisis.’ (Fabbrini 2013: 1003). Since no immediate recovery from the crisis 
occurred after the implementation of the fiscal consolidation measures that were 
mandated by the supra-national organizations, the severity of the EU anti-crisis 
interventions might have triggered feelings of mistrust towards the EU (Armingeon & 
Ceka 2014; Armingeon & Guthman 2014). In fact, citizens in peripheral countries 
might have felt that membership of the EU was no longer beneficial for them 
(Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel & Palmer 1995). Sluggish growth, increasing 
poverty, growing unemployment and increasing polarization between the north and 
the south might have led to the emergence of an ideological divide between north and 
south in terms of trust in EU institutions. 
 
Recent studies have found that trust in political institutions has been declining in 
contemporary democracies (Pharr & Putnam 2000; Newton & Norris 2000; 
Catterberg & Moreno 2005). Most researchers are concerned about the loss of trust in 
the main democratic institutions, as it may be an indicator of political malaise and a 
far greater threat to democracy than an erosion of trust in other citizens or politicians 
(Newton & Norris, 2000). Several studies on public support for European integration 
have taken an economic approach to explain both cross-national and individual 
differences (Anderson & Reichert 1995). At the macro level, public support for the 
integration project is likely to be higher when national economic conditions are 
favourable, while at the micro level, as will be discussed in the following section, 
individuals who assess their economic conditions more positively are more likely to 
support the EU. The purely economic argument positing that the decline in political 
trust is the result of the deterioration in economic conditions has also recently been 
applied to European countries affected by the economic crisis and its consequences 
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(Polavieja 2013). Overall, empirical evidence suggests that trust in institutions moves 
together with fluctuations in economic outcomes (Keele 2007). Anderson & Reichert 
(1996) and Eichenberg & Dalton (1993) examine whether support is linked to 
national economic performance, and the latter find strong evidence in favour of this 
view. Moreover, studies suggest that there is a negative relationship between the 
worsening economic conditions and performances of European countries and citizens’ 
trust in and support for democracy (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014; Ehrmann, Soudan 
& Stracca 2012; Martini & Quaranta 2015; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & Otter 2013; 
Stevenson & Wolfers 2011).  
 
However, many researchers claim that another key determinant of this erosion of trust 
is the incapability of institutions to be responsive to citizens’ demands (Armingeon & 
Guthmann 2014; Offe 2006; Catterberg & Moreno 2005; van der Meer 2010; Torcal 
2014). Hence, trust is expected to respond to government performance (Newton & 
Norris 2000; Lawrence 1997; Torcal 2014). Governments take credit when the 
country is performing well and take the blame when economic performance is poor 
(Lawrence, 1997). Slow growth and increasing inequality put a strain on 
governments’ ability to maintain their obligations. As a result, it is plausible to 
assume that the perceived unresponsiveness of political institutions to citizens’ needs 
and the bad management of the crisis on the parts of both national and European 
institutions might have contributed to a decline in institutional trust in Europe 
(Lawrence 1997; Torcal 2014). ‘When problems aren’t dealt with, it is no surprise 
that citizens experience considerable disillusionment’ (Lawrence 1997: 112). As a 
result, we expect that in the countries most badly hit by the crisis (i.e. the peripheral 
countries), the harsh consequences may have worsened the negative effect of the lack 
of institutional responsiveness on trust in the European Parliament (Torcal 2014).  
Trust in institutions is not only important for the well-being and functioning of 
institutions but it has much broader implications. A recent study by Serricchio, 
Tsakatika & Quaglia (2013) finds that Euroscepticism has steadily increased since the 
onset of the crisis, especially in the Eurozone. It emerges that political institutions 
play an increasingly important role in explaining public Euroscepticism: not only is 
confidence in European institutions negatively correlated with Euroscepticism, but its 
explanatory power increased between 2007 and 2010 (Serricchio, Tsakatika & 
Quaglia 2013). 
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On the basis of this, our first hypothesis is that from before to after the beginning of 
the crisis, trust in the European Parliament declined more steeply in peripheral 
European countries than in countries where the crisis hit less harshly (H1). 
 
Who trusts? The economic side of trust in institutions 
 
As mentioned, trust is not equally distributed among citizens, as some are more 
endowed with trust in institutions than others. In general, it has been argued that 
subjects most endowed with human capital and income are more likely to trust 
institutions because they have more to gain from the social and political system 
(Almond & Verba 1963; Stokes 1962; Dalton 2005). We thus hypothesize that 
individuals hit hardest by the crisis will experience a steeper decline in trust in the 
European Parliament. 
 
Which subjects are the most likely to have suffered the consequences of the economic 
crisis? Indeed, globalization does not affect all members of a national community in 
the same way. More generally, trade liberalization benefits individuals who own 
factors with which the national economy is well endowed, and hurts those who own 
scarce factors (Inglehart 1970; Gabel 1998; Kriesi et al. 2012; Arnold, Sapir & 
Zapryanova 2012). In advanced economies, globalization creates new groups of 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The two most important characteristics that distinguish the 
globalization ‘winners’ from the ‘losers’ are education levels and social class: the 
dividing line runs between low-skilled and high-skilled individuals (Kriesi et al. 
2012). A similar argument has been applied to the European Union. Since the EU has 
been for the most part an economic project, some scholars have hypothesized that EU 
support rests upon economic calculations (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel & 
Palmer 1995). The economic approach to support for the EU thus predicts that both 
subjective economic outcomes – such as perceptions of one’s personal situation – and 
objective economic outcomes – such as occupational status – affect trust in the EU. 
According to the economic approach, it is expected that being highly educated and 
highly skilled should be positively correlated with trust in EU institutions (Gabel & 
Palmer 1995; Anderson & Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998). The underlying rationale is 
that the larger the economic benefits enjoyed by individuals, the greater their support 
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for the EU. Similarly, those most likely to benefit from social programmes are low-
income workers, who will, as a consequence, suffer more from constrained budgetary 
policies. Income should thus be positively related to European support. A different 
line of research argues, on the contrary, that in advanced societies individuals who are 
more equipped with human capital and economic resources are more likely to 
question and criticize the political system they live in (Nevitte 1996; Inglehart 1990). 
Empirical evidence on the topic is mixed. Mosch & Prast (2008), Van der Meer 
(2010) and Clements, Nanou & Verney (2014) find that people with high incomes and 
high levels of education are more likely to trust national and supranational 
institutions. By contrast, Arnold, Sapir & Zapryanova (2012) and Muñoz, Torcal & 
Bonet (2011) find a negative association between higher education levels and trust in 
European institutions. Similarly, Gabel (2003) finds that education is negatively 
correlated with support for the EP and that the latter is for the most part driven by 
citizens’ support for EU membership, their concerns about the scope of EU authority 
and their values regarding representative democracy at the EU level. A large body of 
research building on Inglehart’s (1970) cognitive mobilization theory posits that age 
should be negatively correlated with trust in the EU so that more trust should be 
expected from younger people (Gabel & Palmer 1995; Anderson & Reichert 1996; 
Gabel 1998). Considering the context of the crisis, we question this relationship. 
Given that youth unemployment rates in the periphery reached their highest recorded 
levels in 2012, with peaks of 55.3% and 52.9% respectively for Greece and Spain 
(Eurostat 2012), and that the percentage of youth neither in employment nor 
education or training (NEET) also skyrocketed in 2012, with peaks of 21.2% and 
20.2% respectively in Italy and Greece (Eurostat 2012), we might expect the youth to 
have lower levels of trust in the EP than prime-age subjects. Similarly, the effects of 
austerity measures, such as pension reforms and pension cuts, might have been 
especially harsh on the elderly, further exacerbating the social problems arising from 
an aging population and globalization (OECD 2013; Blossfeld, Buchholz & Kurz 
2011). 
 
To sum up, we argue that the decline in trust will be particularly concentrated among 
the ‘losers’; that is, among the categories that are the most vulnerable to the 
consequences of the economic crisis (Hoynes, Miller & Schaller 2012; Petmesidou & 
Guillén 2014; Matsaganis & Leventi 2014). On the basis of this, we formulate a set of 
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hypotheses, all postulating that in the countries where the recession and the austerity 
measures were especially harsh – i.e. Cyprus, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece – people most badly hit by the economic crisis are more likely to have 
experienced a steeper decline in trust in the EU than elsewhere. Specifically: 
 
H2a: Subjects with lower levels of education are expected to have experienced a 
steeper decline in trust than those with higher education. 
 
H2b: Subjects with perceived lower levels of income are expected to have 
experienced a steeper decline in trust than people who consider themselves better off 
in terms of income. 
 
H2c: The unemployed and the retired are expected to have experienced a steeper 
decline in trust than the employed. 
 
H2d: The youth and the elderly are expected to have experienced a steeper decline in 
trust than prime-age subjects. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data and sample 
 
The data we use are derived from the European Social Survey (ESS 2014). The ESS 
is an academically-driven cross-national survey that aims to measure the attitudes and 
behaviours of citizens in over 30 nations. It is a suitable data source for our analyses 
as it allows changes in trust in institutions over the crucial years of the economic 
recession to be investigated. For the analyses, we pool together the six available 
waves of the ESS, which span from 2002 to 2012. We include all the countries 
available in the dataset that have been members of the EU since before the onset of 
the crisis, which are: Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. Since we 
exclude from the analyses the years prior to a country’s entry in the EU, and because 
not all of the countries considered collected data in each wave, for certain countries 
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we can rely on more points in time than for others. Specifically, we do not have all the 
six waves for: Cyprus (available from 2006 to 2012); Estonia (missing in 2002 and 
2010); France (available from 2006); Greece (missing in 2006 and 2012); and Italy 
(available in 2002, 2004 and 2012). For Hungary, Ireland, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia we rely on the waves from 2004 onwards. Despite the 
patchiness of the data, we are able to reconstruct a time line of trust ranging from 
before to after the onset of the crisis in all the countries. After only selecting subjects 
between 18 and 85 years old and using listwise deletion to remove subjects with 
missing information, the sample consists of 159,096 observations. 
 
Variables and method 
 
Trust in the European Parliament (EP) is used as the dependent variable to tap support 
for the European Union (Easton 1965, 1975; Newton 2001). The variable ranges from 
0 to 10, where 0 indicates no trust at all and 10 indicates complete trust. While other 
indicators of trust in institutions are available in the ESS datai, trust in the European 
Parliament is the only one allowing trust in the EU to be gauged, and it is a suitable 
tool for our analyses due to the central role of the EP in the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU (Gabel 2003). 
 
Given our research question and the structure of the data, and following previous 
research (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014), we use multilevel models to test our 
hypotheses. Our random-intercept cross-classified models nest individuals in 
countries (N 20), waves (N 6) and in country-waves (N 102). Guided by previous 
research (Arnold, Sapir & Zapryanova 2012; Armingeon & Guthmann 2014), all our 
models include a set of controls: gender (men as reference), whether the respondent 
lives with a partner (yes as omitted reference category), whether there are children in 
the household (yes as omitted reference category), how much the respondent is 
interested in politics (from 0, not at all interested, to 4, very interested), how happy 
the respondent is (from 0, extremely unhappy, to 10, extremely happy, mean centred) 
and how satisfied the respondent is with the national government (from 0, extremely 
unsatisfied, to 10, extremely satisfied, mean centred). Last, we include two macro-
level controls: GDP growth and unemployment ratesii, both measured at the country-
wave leveliii. 
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In our first model, to test whether there was a decline in trust between before and after 
the onset of the crisis, we include a time dummy contrasting the pre-crisis waves (i.e. 
up to 2006 = 0) with the three waves available after the onset of the crisis (2008, 2010 
and 2012 = 1). We also include a dummy for peripheral countries (Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Greece = 1, otherwise = 0) to investigate whether trust 
is generally lower in these countries than in continental, Nordic and eastern European 
countries. Then, to test our first hypothesis, which is whether the decline in trust was 
steeper in peripheral countries than the rest, we add an interaction between the time 
dummy and the peripheral country dummy (Model 1). 
 
To test the association between trust and social position (Dalton 2005), Model 2 adds 
four variables: the level of education of the respondent (lower education, i.e. ISCED 
0, 1 and 2, contrasted with higher education, ISCED 3 to 6, used as reference); the 
respondent’s feelings about the household’s current income (perceived higher income, 
i.e. the respondent reports coping on his/her present income or living comfortably on 
it, used as reference category vs. perceived low income, i.e. the respondent reports 
finding it difficult or very difficult to cope on his/her present income); the 
respondent’s employment status (in paid work or in education as reference category 
vs. unemployed, retired or other non-employed); the age of the respondent, a 
categorical variable where being 34 or younger is the reference category, contrasted 
with being between 35 and 64, and being 65 or older. 
 
To verify whether trust declined most among the lower social strata in peripheral 
countries, in Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Tables 3 and 4) we include a three-way interaction 
where each of these variables is interacted with the time and peripheral dummyiv. 
Summary statistics of the variables for the overall sample are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
RESULTS 
 
Trends in trust in European countries 
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Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 shows trust in the European Parliament in the countries considered during 
the years of the crisis. In northern and western European countries, trust in the 
European Parliament did not follow a homogenous trend. It remained stable overall 
with some fluctuations in countries such as Belgium, Germany, Finland and the 
Netherlands; it increased in Denmark and Sweden; and it slightly decreased in France 
and the UK. The UK represents a case in point as trust in the European Parliament is 
notably lower there than elsewhere, but has not decreased dramatically. Declining 
trends in trust can also be seen in central and eastern European countries, such as the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. However, in line 
with hypothesis 1, the largest declines in trust in the EU Parliament occurred in 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain. Greece stands out as being the 
country with the highest trust prior to the crisis (5.7) and the lowest afterwards (2.5). 
Considering the divergent trend in trust in peripheral vis-à-vis northern and western 
European countries, it appears reasonable to expect cross-national differences in the 
extent to which social classes are driving the decline in trust. This will be discussed in 
the following section. 
 
Social inequalities and trust in institutions before and after the crisis 
 
We now move to the results from the multilevel models. Table 2 contains the 
coefficients and standard errors of the random-intercept regressions modelling trust in 
the European Parliament. 
 
In our baseline model (Model 0) we only include a set of controls and the main terms 
for the post-crisis period and for peripheral countries. As far as the controls are 
concerned, women seem to trust the EP more than men (0.195, p<0.001). Moreover, 
compared to subjects who have a partner and children, individuals without a partner (-
0.235, p<0.001) and without children (-0.078, p<0.001) have lower trust. 
Unsurprisingly, the more respondents are interested in politics, the more they trust the 
European Parliament (0.315, p<0.001). People who are happier (0.104, p<0.001) and 
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are satisfied with the government (0.392, p<0.001) are also more likely to have higher 
trust in the EP. The two macro-level predictors are negative but small and not 
statistically significant. 
 
Moving to the predictors of interest, the model shows a negative albeit non-significant 
coefficient for the post-crisis period (-0.151, p>0.05), suggesting that the effect of 
time might vary among the countries considered. Instead, the coefficient for 
peripheral countries is large and positive (0.493, p<0.001), indicating that, overall, 
subjects in this group of countries had higher levels of trust than individuals living 
elsewhere. 
 
Model 1 adds the interaction between the dummy indicating the post-crisis period and 
the one for peripheral countries, which, as hypothesized, is negative and statistically 
significant (-0.3, p<0.05), suggesting that the decline in trust after the crisis was 
steeper in peripheral countries than in the remaining countries. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Model 2 adds the socioeconomic characteristics. As anticipated, individuals with 
lower education levels and with lower perceived income have less trust in the 
European Parliament than subjects with higher education and higher perceived 
income (-0.171, p<0.001 and -0.119, p<0.001 respectively). Furthermore, the 
unemployed (-0.05, p<0.01) and the retired and other non-employed (-0.102, 
p<0.001) have somewhat less trust than employed subjects. The differences between 
age groups are substantial, as younger individuals have higher trust in the European 
Parliament compared to prime-age subjects (-0.378, p<0.001) and subjects over 65 (-
0.400 p<0.001). These results indicate that individuals who are worse off in terms of 
education, income and employment status tend to have less trust in the EU than 
better-off individuals (Almond & Verba 1963; Stokes 1962; Inglehart 1970; Anderson 
& Reichter 1996; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998). However, people who are at 
the beginning of their employment career, i.e. the youth, actually have more trust than 
prime-age subjects, whose level of trust is lower and similar to that of older citizens. 
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Do these results vary cross-nationally and over time? The models discussed below 
investigate the effects of education and income (Table 3) and of employment status 
and age (Table 4) respectively in peripheral countries after the beginning of the crisis. 
Starting with Model 3, the main terms remain mostly unchanged in sign and 
magnitude compared to Model 2. However, the interaction between peripheral 
countries and the post-crisis period is no longer statistically significant, indicating that 
the decline in trust in these countries was not present among the high educated. 
Indeed, what is crucial for hypothesis H2a is that the coefficient for the three-way 
interaction between low education, post-crisis period and peripheral countries is 
negative and statistically significant (-0.198, p<0.001). This brings some support to 
our hypothesis, as it indicates that the more poorly educated in peripheral countries 
are the subjects whose trust declined the most. The results for income quite closely 
mirror those for education, as the coefficient for the three-way interaction is negative 
and significant (-0.204, p<0.001). This brings support for hypothesis H2b, according 
to which the decline in trust was steeper among subjects with lower incomesv. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Table 4 reports the results for employment status (Model 5) and for age (Model 6). As 
can be seen from Model 5, the main term for the unemployed is negative and non-
significant, while the main term for other non-employed is negative and strongly 
significant (-0.156, p<0.001), meaning that prior to the crisis and in “core” countries 
trust in the EP was lower among this group of subjects. The main term for the post-
crisis period is once again negative but non-significant and the main term for 
peripheral countries is positive and significant. More importantly, the interactions 
between peripheral countries and unemployment (0.072, p>0.10) and other non-
employed (0.301, p<0.001) are positive and in the latter case significant, indicating 
that prior to the crisis in these countries the two groups actually had more trust in the 
EP than the group of employed subjects. However, when it comes to the three-way 
interaction term for periphery, unemployed and post-crisis, the coefficient is negative 
and significant at 90% (-0.188, p<0.10). In contrast, the coefficients for the three-way 
interaction term for periphery, other non-employed and post-crisis is of negligible 
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magnitude and not significant. Taken as a whole, these results bring partial support to 
hypothesis H2c, as they show that the greatest fall in trust was among one of the less 
fortunate groups, the unemployed, in the countries most badly hit by the economic 
crisis. 
 
Moving to the results for age, we can see from the main terms for age in Model 6 that 
trust is significantly higher among the younger group as opposed to prime-age (-
0.452, p<0.001) and older subjects (-0.517, p<0.001), at least in the core group of 
countries and before the crisis. In fact, the coefficients for the interaction between age 
and peripheral countries are positive and significant, offsetting the main effects. 
Hence, in peripheral countries the differences in trust by age prior to the crisis appear 
much smaller than in core countries. However, the beginning of the crisis seems to 
have triggered a small drop in trust among the two older groups (-0.064, p<0.05 and -
0.095, p<0.05 respectively), which seems to have happened in both core and 
peripheral countries, considering that the three-way interactions are non-significant. 
Thus, we do not find support for hypothesis H2d. In fact, on the one hand, the youth 
and the elderly are not likely to trust the EP less than the prime-age group in 
peripheral countries. On the other hand, although trust seems to have declined 
somewhat after the beginning of the crisis among the two older groups, this effect is 
not confined to the peripheral group but is present in core countries as well. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has investigated whether support for a crucial institution, the EU 
Parliament, operationalized via trust in it, changed from before to after the beginning 
of the economic crisis in 20 European countries. The article makes two contributions 
to the literature. First, our results indicate that the loss in trust was larger in countries 
hit harshly by the economic crisis, in line with recent findings of a negative 
relationship between worsening economic conditions and the performances of 
European countries and citizens’ trust and support for democracy (Armingeon & 
Guthmann 2014; Morlino & Quaranta 2014). Second, our findings indicate that after 
the crisis struck the link between social inequalities and trust in institutions became 
stronger in the countries strongly hit by the economic downturn. Thus, we have 
shown that in the countries where austerity measures were implemented, subjects 
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from the lower positions in the social ladder – especially the poorly educated, those 
who find it difficult to cope on their income and, to a smaller extent, the unemployed 
– lost more trust in the European Parliament compared to those who are better off. 
 
In recent decades, social scientists have been concerned about the decline in political 
trust across the western world (Catterberg & Moreno 2005; Putnam 2002). In 
addition, scholars have recently argued that the economic crisis may have triggered 
feelings of mistrust towards institutions in the countries where the crisis hit more 
harshly (Armingeon & Guthmann 2014). Understanding whether there has been such 
a trend and the magnitude of the decline in trust is important. When citizens are 
discontented with economic performance, mistrust in government increases. The 
economic crisis and the growing scarcity of resources have been putting democratic 
institutions under pressure, resulting in a negative evaluation of political 
responsiveness and a subsequent decline in citizens’ levels of institutional trust 
(Torcal 2014). Indeed, studies show that if large numbers of citizens start mistrusting 
institutions (Kaltenthaler, Anderson & Miller 2010) and if this fall in trust is sudden 
and consistent (Newton 2001), the legitimacy and survival of the institutions may be 
at serious risk. The opposite is also true: more trust in them is found to lead to better 
functioning institutions (Ehrmann, Soudan & Stracca 2013), a truly valuable good in 
times of economic downturn. Our article has shown that in countries hit by the 
economic recession trust in the European Parliament steeply declined from before to 
after the onset of the crisis (Stevenson & Wolfers 2011; Roth, Nowak-Lehmann & 
Otter 2013). 
 
In addition to the expected result that trust in the EP declined the most over time in 
countries hit the hardest by the crisis, our article makes another contribution to the 
literature by unveiling the existence of a gap in trust between the better- and the 
worse-off social strata, a gap that is actually widening over time. In terms of both 
subjective and objective economic status, we find that the less fortunate – the poorly 
educated, those who have difficulties coping on their present income, and the 
unemployed – experienced a steeper decline in trust from before to after the onset of 
the crisis than those who are highly educated, live well on their income or are 
employed. In other words, the economic crisis led to greater losses in trust at the 
bottom than at the top of the social ladder. This finding fits well with early studies on 
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the determinants of trust in institutions in general (Almond & Verba 1963; Stokes 
1962) and on European integration in particular (Inglehart 1970; Anderson & Reichter 
1996; Gabel 1998). Nonetheless, it is a troubling finding as it indicates that political 
inequalities increased with the economic crisis. Indeed, trust in institutions is not only 
essential for the functioning of democracies but it is also an important individual 
asset. Citizens who trust their institutions are more likely to be politically active 
within them and to voice their need to improve their social position. Thus, the greater 
losses in trust over the onset of the crisis period experienced by the economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups may potentially lead to their alienation from the 
political world, or worse, to anti-democratic and authoritarian mobilization (Kriesi et 
al. 2012; Offe 2006). Recent studies (Kriesi et al. 2012) have found that globalization 
‘losers’ are more likely to show support for radical right-wing parties mobilizing 
against immigration and European integration. This feeling of unresponsiveness of 
European institutions to the social conflicts generated by the economic crisis has 
indeed created the opportunity for populist parties to exploit the popular malaise 
against the status quo and often to appeal to nationalism and anti-EU feelings (Kriesi 
et al. 2012; Torcal 2014). 
 
To conclude, additional analyses ‒ not shown for reasons of space but available upon 
request ‒ show that the decline in trust among the lower social strata was not confined 
exclusively to individuals in the countries most badly hit by the crisis but was also 
found, albeit of much smaller magnitude, in countries where the economic crisis was 
not so harsh. As Torcal (2014) suggests, this might imply that the erosion of trust 
should not be merely attributed to the economic crisis but it might also be due to 
citizens’ perceptions that European institutions are in general unresponsive to their 
demands. Thus, future research should investigate other elements beyond the 
economic crisis that could be behind falling trust in the EP. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics of the variables for the overall sample. 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Trust in European Parliament 4.3 2.4 
   
Interested in politics (1-4) 2.5 0.91 
Happiness (0-10) 7.3 1.9 
Satisfaction with government (0-10) 3.9 2.4 
GDP growth rate 1.4 2.3 
Unemployment rate 9.1 4.2 
 
 Proportion  
Education   
Higher education 0.68  
Lower education 0.32  
   
Feelings about household’s current income: 
Perceived higher income 0.80  
Perceived lower income 0.20  
 
Employment status 
In paid work or in education 0.60  
Unemployed 0.06  
Retired & other not employed 0.34  
   
Age   
<=34 0.26  
35-64 0.56  
>=65 0.18  
   
Women 0.50  
Partner: yes 0.66  
Children in HH: no 0.57  
   
N 159,096  
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Table 2 Multilevel Linear Models Predicting Trust in the European Parliament. Unstandardized 
Coefficients, Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 3.982*** 3.866*** 4.162*** 
 (0.156) (0.165) (0.161) 
Post-crisis -0.151 -0.076 -0.064 
 (0.093) (0.108) (0.104) 
Peripheral countries 0.493** 0.637*** 0.68*** 
 (0.22) (0.226) (0.221) 
Post-crisis × Peripheral countries  -0.3* -0.3* 
  (0.154) (0.154) 
Higher education (r.c)    
Lower education   -0.171*** 
   (0.013) 
Feelings about household’s income: perceived higher income 
(r.c) 
   
Perceived lower income   -0.119*** 
   (0.014) 
Employment status: in paid status or in education (r.c.)    
Unemployed   -0.05* 
   (0.023) 
Retired & other not employed   -0.102*** 
   (0.015) 
Age: <=34 (r.c)    
Age 35 - 64   -0.378*** 
   (0.013) 
Age >64   -0.4*** 
   (0.02) 
Controls:    
Women: men (r.c) 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.227*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Partner: no -0.235*** -0.235*** -0.141*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Children: no -0.078*** -0.078*** -0.057*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Interest in politics 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.315*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Happiness 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.08*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Satisfaction with government 0.392*** 0.392*** 0.391*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
GDP growth rate -0.009 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate -0.014 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
Random components (standard deviations)    
Wave (Intercept) 0.07912 0.0933 0.08571 
Country (Intercept) 0.42345 0.4107 0.39802 
Country × Wave (Intercept) 0.31250 0.3054 0.30586 
Residual 2.08689 2.0869 2.07541 
    
N of observations  159,096 
N of waves  6 
N of countries  20 
N of country-waves  102 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 two-tailed    
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Table 3 Multilevel Linear Models Predicting Trust in the European Parliament. Unstandardized Coefficients, Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
  Education  Income 
 Model 3  Model4 
Intercept 4.185*** Intercept 4.167*** 
 (0.161)  (0.161) 
Higher education (r.c.)  Perceived higher income (r.c.)  
Lower education -0.246*** Perceived lower income -0.141*** 
 (0.022)  (0.025) 
Post-crisis -0.08 Post-crisis -0.066 
 (0.104)  (0.104) 
Peripheral countries 0.576** Peripheral countries 0.636** 
 (0.221)  (0.221) 
Low ed. × Post-crisis 0.058* Low income × Post-crisis 0.008 
 (0.029)  (0.032) 
Low ed. × Peripheral countries 0.242*** Low income × Peripheral countries 0.174*** 
 (0.038)  (0.043) 
Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.211 Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.244 
 (0.155)  (0.153) 
Low ed. × Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.198*** Low income × Post-crisis × Peripheral 
countries 
-0.204*** 
 (0.051)  (0.056) 
Random components (standard deviations)    
Wave (Intercept) 0.08559 Wave (Intercept) 0.0862 
Country (Intercept) 0.39733 Country (Intercept) 0.3994 
Country × Wave (Intercept) 0.30454 Country × Wave (Intercept) 0.3031 
Residual 2.07516 Residual 2.0753 
    
N of observations 159,096 
N of waves 6 
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N of countries 20 
N of countries-waves 102 
  
Note: the models also control for gender, whether the respondent lives with a partner and has children, interest in politics, happiness, 
satisfaction with government, GDP growth rate and unemployment rates. 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 two-tailed 
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Table 4 Multilevel Linear Models Predicting Trust in the European Parliament. Unstandardized Coefficients, Standard Errors in 
Parentheses. 
 Employment 
status 
 Age 
 Model 5  Model 6 
Intercept 4.175*** Intercept 4.221*** 
 (0.161)  (0.161) 
In paid status or in education (r.c.)  Age <=34 (r.c.)  
Unemployed -0.07 35-64 -0.452*** 
 (0.042)  (0.022) 
Retired & other not employed -0.156*** 65 and older -0.517*** 
 (0.022)  (0.031) 
Post-crisis -0.055 Post-crisis -0.005 
 (0.104)  (0.106) 
Peripheral countries 0.568* Peripheral countries 0.341 
 (0.221)  (0.222) 
Unemployed × Post-crisis 0.086 35-64 × Post-crisis -0.064* 
 (0.056)  (0.029) 
Retired & other not employed × Post-crisis -0.034 65 and older × Post-crisis -0.095* 
 (0.026)  (0.037) 
Unemployed × Peripheral countries 0.072 35-64 × Peripheral countries 0.413*** 
 (0.083)  (0.042) 
Retired & other not employed × Peripheral countries 0.301*** 65 and older × Peripheral countries 0.659*** 
 (0.038)  (0.053) 
Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.267 Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.3 
 (0.155)  (0.158) 
Unemployed × Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.188 35-64 × Post-crisis × Peripheral countries 0.002 
 (0.101)  (0.056) 
Retired & other not employed × Post-crisis × Peripheral 
countries 
-0.04 65 and older × Post-crisis × Peripheral countries -0.047 
31 
 
 (0.051)  (0.07) 
    
Random components (standard deviations)    
Wave (Intercept) 0.08652 Wave (Intercept) 0.0861
5 
Country (Intercept) 0.39861 Country (Intercept) 0.3954
7 
Country × Wave (Intercept) 0.30534 Country × Wave (Intercept) 0.3055
6 
Residual 2.07452 Residual 2.0729
9 
      
N of observations 159,096 
N of years 6 
N of countries 20 
N of countries-years 102 
Note: the models also control for gender, whether the respondent lives with a partner and has children, interest in politics, happiness, 
satisfaction with government, GDP growth rate and unemployment rate. 
***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 two-tailed 
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Figure 1 Mean values of trust in the European parliament before and after the onset of the crisis by country 
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i In an exploratory stage we also ran the models using trust in national parliaments and trust in politicians and political 
parties as dependent variables. The results (not shown but available upon request) mirror quite closely those for the 
European Parliament, indicating a generalized decline in trust in national and supranational institutions, especially in 
countries most hit by the economic crisis and among the lower social strata. 
 
ii The GDP growth rate measure comes from the Economy and Finance theme, National Accounts subtheme, of the Eurostat 
database. It is measured as the percentage change over the previous period of gross domestic product at market prices. The 
unemployment measure comes from the Population and Social Conditions theme, Labour Market subtheme, of the Eurostat 
database. The annual unemployment rate is measured from the European Union Labour force survey (EU LFS). 
 
iii In preliminary analyses, other macro-level variables such as length of EU membership were also included in the models 
but were ultimately excluded as they were not significant and of negligible magnitude. 
 
iv To further test the robustness of the association, each of the four variables (education, income, employment status and age 
respectively) was also allowed to vary at the country-wave level. The results (not shown but available upon request) do not 
vary substantially from the random-intercept models. 
 
v It should be noted that although the three-way interactions terms of interest are significant at the 99% level, not all the 
interactions terms are statistically significant. Therefore, some caution is required in the overall interpretation of the 
statistical significance of the results. 
